Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets - The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity by Graevenitz, Georg von et al.
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15  www.sfbtr15.de 
Universität Mannheim  Freie Universität Berlin  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn  Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer.  Department of Economics  University of Bonn  D-53113 Bonn, 
Phone: +49(0228)739220  Fax: +49(0228)739221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*University of Munich 
** University of Munich 
*** University of Munich 
 
 
 
 
April 2011 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 
Discussion Paper No. 356 
 
Incidence and Growth of Patent 
Thickets - The Impact of 
Technological Opportunities and 
Complexity 
Georg von Graevenitz* 
Stefan Wagner** 
 Dietmar Harhoff*** 
Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets - The Impact
of Technological Opportunities and Complexity
Georg von Graevenitz∗, Stefan Wagner†, Dietmar Harhoff‡
April 7, 2011
Abstract
We investigate incidence and evolution of patent thickets. Our empirical analysis is based
on a theoretical model of patenting in complex and discrete technologies. The model cap-
tures how competition for patent portfolios and complementarity of patents affect patent-
ing incentives. We show that lower technological opportunities increase patenting in-
centives in complex technologies while they decrease incentives in discrete technologies.
Also, more competitors increase patenting incentives in complex technologies and reduce
them in discrete technologies. To test these predictions a new measure of the density of
patent thickets is introduced. European patent citations are used to construct measures of
fragmentation and technological opportunity. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel
capturing patenting behavior of 2074 firms in 30 technology areas over 15 years. GMM
estimation results confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. The results show that
patent thickets exist in 9 out of 30 technology areas. We find that decreased technological
opportunities are a surprisingly strong driver of patent thicket growth.
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1 Introduction
Strong increases in the level of patent applications have been observed at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) (Kortum and Lerner, 1998, Hall, 2005a) and the Eu-
ropean Patent Office (EPO) (von Graevenitz et al., 2007). These “patent explosions” pose
serious challenges for existing patent systems and also for competition authorities.1
Explanations for this shift in patenting behavior focus on changes in the legal environment
and management practices, the complexity of some technologies, greater technological oppor-
tunities and increased strategic behavior on the part of firms. While it has been shown that
most of these factors play a role empirically, there are no explanations of patenting behavior
that integrate the effects of these determinants.2 This paper provides such an integrative model
and an empirical test of its predictions. We introduce a new measure of complexity of block-
ing relationships, allowing us to quantify the extent of patent thickets. With this measure we
show that patent thickets exist in 9 of the 30 technology areas making up the patent system and
are growing to include more firms. Our empirical results also reveal that patenting responds
surprisingly strongly to variation in technological opportunities.
Kortum and Lerner (1998, 1999) investigated the explosion of patenting at the USPTO
which began around 1984 (Hall, 2005a). By a process of elimination they argue that increased
patenting mainly results from changed management practices making R&D more applied and
raising the yield of patents from R&D. Kortum and Lerner (1998, 1999) and Hall and Ziedonis
(2001) also explore whether enhanced fertility of R&D led to an increase in patent filings, but
cannot find systematic evidence for this. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) provide evidence that the
patenting surge is a strategic response to an increased threat of hold-up specifically in complex
technologies in which products depend on the combination of large numbers of patents. Com-
plexity of a technology implies that patents are natural complements, and therefore hold-up
arises easily if patent ownership is dispersed (Shapiro, 2001, Ziedonis, 2004). Hall (2005a)
also shows that the patenting surge is driven by firms whose main technologies are complex.
Our model of patenting juxtaposes patenting incentives in complex and discrete technolo-
gies. In the model patenting incentives arise from the interaction of technological opportunity
(fertility) and the complexity of technologies. To model the joint effect of these determi-
nants of patenting, we posit a two dimensional matrix of technological opportunities and of
patentable innovations within each such opportunity. We refer to the latter as facets. Firms
choose between pursuing new technological opportunities and deepening protection of spe-
cific opportunities by patenting of more facets. Analysis of the model shows that firms’ ac-
tions are strategic substitutes in discrete technologies but become strategic complements in
1For extensive discussions of the policy questions surrounding current functioning of the patent systems in
the United States and in Europe refer to National Research Council (2004), Federal Trade Commission (2003),
Jaffe and Lerner (2004), von Graevenitz et al. (2007) and Bessen and Meurer (2008).
2Formal models of patenting abound, for a survey of this literature refer to Scotchmer (2005) or Gallini
and Scotchmer (2002). Formal models of patenting in patent thickets do not attempt to span both complex and
discrete technologies as we do here: Bessen (2004), Clark and Konrad (2008) and Siebert and von Graevenitz
(2010). These models build on the patent race literature pioneered by Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980),
Reinganum (1989) and Beath et al. (1989).
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sufficiently complex technologies. In a complex technology firms patent less in response to
increasing technological opportunities and more if more other firms compete for patents. Both
effects result from strategic interaction of firms in a complex technology: greater technolog-
ical opportunities reduce pressures on firms to defend their stake in existing technologies by
patenting heavily, whereas greater competition increases this pressure.
Predictions derived from the model are tested using a comprehensive data set based on
EPO patent data. It comprises information on patenting behavior between 1987 and 2002
spanning complex and discrete technologies. We measure the complexity of blocking in a
technology area using information specific to European patents. Patent examiners at the EPO
indicate which prior patents block or restrict the breadth of the patent application under review.
We count how often three or more firms apply for mutually blocking patents within a three
year period. This gives rise to a count of mutually blocking firm triples. The measure cap-
tures complex blocking relationships which arise even if patent ownership remains relatively
concentrated. This new measure is validated by showing that greater incidence of complex
blocking relationships is correlated with the classifications of technological complexity sug-
gested by Cohen et al. (2000).
Patenting behavior is known to be highly persistent, due to the long term nature of firms’
R&D investment decisions. We control for the persistence of patenting by including a lagged
dependent variable in the empirical model. The model is estimated using systems GMM es-
timators (Blundell and Bond, 1998, Arellano, 2003, Alvarez and Arellano, 2003) to control
for endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. Additionally, we treat measures of techno-
logical opportunity, complexity and fragmentation as predetermined. Results from OLS, fixed
effects and GMM regressions support our theoretical predictions. In particular, decreasing
technological opportunities and increasing complexity lead to more patent filings. Thus, our
paper suggests a new rationale for the rise of patent filings since the mid-1980s.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical model
of patenting which explains firms’ patenting strategies. We derive three hypotheses from this
model that are empirically testable. In Section 3 we describe our data set and the variables
we employ to analyze firms’ patenting behavior. As there is little cross industry evidence of
patenting trends at the EPO, Section 4 provides a descriptive analysis of these trends, focusing
particularly on our own measure and alternative measures of complexity. Section 5 provides
the empirical model and results and Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Patenting
Here we present a model of patenting behavior. This model shows how technological oppor-
tunity and complexity of technology affect the levels of patenting set by firms. Technological
opportunity and complexity are assumed to be fixed in the short- to medium term.3 First,
3In the long run technological opportunity may be affected by firms’ patenting efforts. Unravelling this
question will require a separate study with data on firms’ R&D activities over a very long period.
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we motivate the model and discuss assumptions. Then, we provide a number of definitions.
Next we solve the model, presenting several predictions. These underpin the empirical results
presented in Sections 4 and 5 below.
2.1 Motivation
The following model captures patenting incentives in discrete and complex technologies. We
characterize how the degree of technological opportunity and the complexity of a technology
determine the level of patenting of that technology.
We recognize that the patent system covers a multitude of different technology areas.
Within these we posit distinct technological opportunities that derive from separate research
efforts. Each technological opportunity consists of one or more patentable facets. Every facet
corresponds to a potential patent. Technologically related facets are grouped together in tech-
nological opportunities because they derive from the same knowledge and science base.
The underlying model of R&D and of the patent office is kept as simple as possible: firms
select how many technological opportunities to research and how many facets of each to seek
to patent. Facets and opportunities are chosen randomly by each firm. Where more than one
applicant applies for a facet, that is randomly assigned to one applicant. Patent allocation is
the sole function of the patent office in the model. These assumptions capture competition
between firms seeking to make enough applications to ensure that some result in granted
patents. This model can be presented as a matrix of patents that firms compete to patent:
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Figure 1: Complexity and the number of patentable facets per technological opportunity.
This figure shows different matrices corresponding to technology areas with growing levels
of complexity and varying levels of technological opportunity. Complexity increases with the
number of facets. With higher complexity it is increasingly probable that ownership of patents
in a technological opportunity becomes dispersed. We assume that the value of owning patents
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in technological opportunities with more than one facet depends on the share of patents in
each technological opportunity that firms own. This captures the interdependence of patents
in complex technologies and the possibility for hold-up within them. In this model hold-up
arises within technological opportunities but not between them.
Consider two examples: first, one patent generally suffices for the applicant to protect an
ethical drug effectively against attempts to invent around the patent. This is the case of a
discrete technology in which each patent covers one technological opportunity. Second, laser
technology is used in a very wide range of applications such as eye surgery (e.g. LASIK)
or pollution monitoring and forestry management (LIDAR). This is the case of a complex
technology area within the field of optics.4 Each application of laser technology can be thought
of as a technological opportunity requiring a range of different patentable inventions that are
combined in a functioning product. A product using laser technology will usually also embody
some patents relating to different technological areas outside of optics, but this is a point our
model abstracts from. Due to the complexity of the technology hold-up may arise: in the
case of LASIK there has was a string of court cases between VISX Inc. and Nidek Inc. after
1998 regarding infringement of VISX patents on LASIK. The companies finally settled their
disputes world wide in April of 2003.
We do not explicitly model such hold-up or its resolution. The literature on patent thickets
shows that several institutional arrangements allow firms to disentangle overlapping property
rights - these include licensing, patent pools, standard setting as well as litigation (Shapiro,
2001, Scotchmer, 2005). There is some evidence that firms holding a large share of patents
within a given technology benefit substantially from their patent portfolio and may be able to
reduce the likelihood of hold-up (Grindley and Teece, 1997, Shapiro, 2001, Ziedonis, 2004).
This is attributed to an increase in bargaining power. Additional patents also reduce marginal
legal costs as the share of patents grows: firms with a large share of patents on a technological
opportunity will need to cross-license or litigate less (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).
Our model abstracts from the link between patents and the product market, assuming only
that the technological opportunities firms are patenting are valuable. In complex technologies
patents may be complements: then the value of the entire technology grows as more compo-
nents of the technology are patented. The process of patenting is also modeled simply: once
firms invest in R&D for a technological opportunity the number of facets they seek to patent
is limited only by the costs of maintaining granted patents. The probability of obtaining a
granted patent on a facet falls with the number of rivals also seeking to patent that facet.
This model allows us to capture competition for patents in discrete technologies and in
complex technologies. As we show next the nature of competition depends on the complexity
of a technology and the complementarity of facets in each opportunity.
4To further clarify the definitions of opportunities, facets and technology areas we discuss the example of
LED technology at greater length in Appendix D.
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2.2 Assumptions
We study a setting in which a technology area is characterized by (O) technological opportuni-
ties each of which consists of patentable facets. A technological opportunity is an independent
source of profit to a firm and each facet is a separate patentable invention which is part of the
opportunity. The total number of patentable inventions (facets) offered by a technological op-
portunity is F . Thus a technology area is discrete if F = 1. We assume that:5
All technological opportunities in a technology area are symmetrical; they offer the
same number of facets, and costs of R&D and of patenting are identical. (S)
The total set of patentable inventions in a technology consists of Ω = O × F facets.
As F grows the underlying technology grows more complex. If there is more technological
opportunity, O grows. Variation in the two dimensions of the set of available patents Ω arises
for different reasons. Current efforts in basic R&D open additional new opportunities in the
future raising O. The number of facets which are patentable on a given opportunity depends
mainly on the nature of technology but also on institutional and legal factors.
Each technological opportunity is associated with a maximal total value V (F ) and an actu-
ally attained value V (F˜ ). The attained value depends on the number of facets actually patented
by all firms F˜ , which may be less or equal to the number of available facets F . Firms appro-
priate a share s of the attained value by acquiring patents. To capture the complementarity of
inventions in complex technologies we assume that the value of the technological opportunity
increases in the number of facets of that opportunity patented by all firms F˜ :6
V (0) = 0 and
∂V
∂F˜
> 0 . (CI)
There are N + 1 firms active in a given technology area. Each can apply for patent protec-
tion for all facets of a technological opportunity. A firm’s strategy consists of the number
of opportunities ok (ok ∈ [0, O]) it invests in and the number of facets fk (fk ∈ [0, F ]) per
opportunity which it seeks to patent. Subscripts index the firm. Each firm can only make one
patent application per facet and it can only patent in technological opportunities which it has
researched . It trades off patenting more facets per opportunity and patenting in more different
technological opportunities. While patenting additional facets is assumed to be costless,7 a
maintenance fee is payable (Ca) on granted patents. Additionally, firms must undertake costly
R&D (Co) on each technological opportunity they turn to. Finally, costs of coordinating sepa-
5Note that this assumption rules out aspects of complexity that may be quite important in practice. Thus
we rule out that some facets may belong to more than one technological opportunity, making patents on them
particularly valuable blocking patents. We leave this aspect of complexity for future work.
6A similar assumption is made by Lerner and Tirole (2004).
7Wemake this assumption in order to simplify the model, but it can be shown that it does not affect our results
if patent filing costs are sufficiently low in comparison to the costs of maintenance. In practice, initial application
and examination fees for patents are indeed much lower than post-grant translation and renewal fees, since most
patent offices cross-subsidize the initial stages in order to encourage patent filing.
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rate research projects (Cc) are generally viewed as significant in the literature (Roberts, 2004).
To summarize:
i Per opportunity a firm invests in, it faces costs of R&D: Co.
ii Per granted patent a firm faces costs of maintaining that patent: Ca.
iii The coordination of R&D on different technological opportunities imposes costsCc(ok).
Therefore, we assume that ∂Cc
∂ok
> 0. (FV C)
As the number of facets per technological opportunity grows, so does the probability that
different firms own patents belonging to one opportunity. Hold-up becomes increasingly
likely. Then, firms need to disentangle ownership rights, giving rise to legal costs (LC).
These encompass the costs of monitoring, licensing, and negotiating settlements as well as
court fees. As noted above, a greater share of patents per technological opportunity reduces
marginal costs of resolving hold-up. If we define the expected share of patents granted to firm
k: sk ≡ pkfk
/
F˜ Therefore, we assume:
∂L
∂sk
> 0 ,
∂2L
∂sk2
< 0 , (LC)
where sk is the expected share of granted patents obtained in each technological opportunity.
Note that the terms of licensing deals or any other arrangements that resolve hold-up will
depend on the size of firms’ patent portfolios and on the relatedness of patents (Siebert and
von Graevenitz, 2010). We capture this in a very reduced form approach, using the notion of
the share of patents owned per technological opportunity to keep the model manageable.
We assume throughout that the levels of N , O, F and V are known by all patenting firms.
2.3 Definitions
This subsection sets out a number of definitions that follow from our previous assumptions.
Given that the number of firms N is common knowledge, firms can compute the expected
number of rivals active within a technological opportunity, the expected number of facets on
which patents are granted and the likelihood of obtaining a patent grant.
The expected number of rivals (NO) competing for patents within a technological oppor-
tunity is derived in Appendix A.1. It depends on technological opportunity (O), the overall
number of firms in a technology area N and each rival’s investments in R&D (oj). We show
that:
∂NO
∂O
< 0 and
∂NO
∂oj
> 0 . (1)
To simplify notation we define the share of facets each firm k applies for per technological
opportunity as φk ≡ fk
/
F . Given our simplified model of the patent application process the
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expected number of facets per technological opportunity on which patents are granted is:
F˜ (fk, f 6k, F,NO(O,o 6k, N)) = F
[
1− (1− φk)
NO∏
j 6=k,j=1
(1− φj)
]
, (2)
where f 6k,o 6k are vectors containing the choices of the number of facets and the number of
opportunities to invest in made by all rival firms. This expression results from the assumptions
that firms randomly choose facets and that the patent office randomly selects which application
to grant. This model of patenting captures coordination failure and duplication of applications
by firms. Then, the proportion of facets covered by at least one applicant is one minus the
number of facets attracting no applications. In Appendix A.2 we show that the number of
facets covered increases in the complexity of the technology, in the number of rivals investing
in a technological opportunity and also in the number of facets each firm invests in:
∂F˜
∂F
> 0 ,
∂F˜
∂NO
> 0 and
∂F˜
∂fk
> 0 ,
∂F˜
∂fj
> 0. (3)
We assume that the patent office will grant each application for a patent on a facet with
equal probability, but only grants one patent overall on the facet.Then the probability of patent-
ing a facet depends on the expected number of rivals seeking to patent each facet and the prob-
ability with which the particular number of rivals occurs. In Appendix A.3 we show that the
probability that firm k obtains a patent on a given facet is:
pk(f 6k, F,NO(O,o 6k, N)) =
NO∑
l=0
1
l + 1
(
NO
l
)NO−l∏
i=0
(1− φi)
NO∏
j=NO−l
φj . (4)
This expression shows that the probability of obtaining a patent on an application is a sum
of weighted probabilities. Each element of the sum consists of the weighted probability of
obtaining a patent 1
/
(1 + l) given the number of rival firms also seeking a patent on the facet
l. The weight captures the probability of observing a given number of rivals. In Appendix A.3
we show that the probability of obtaining a patent decreases in the level of facets rival firms
seek to patent and in the number of rival firms per technological opportunity:
∂pk
∂φj
< 0 and
∂pk
∂NO
< 0 . (5)
Finally, define the expected share of patents granted to firm k: sk ≡ pkfk
/
F˜ and the elasticity
of the value of a technological opportunity (V )with respect to covered patents (F˜ ): µ ≡ ∂V
∂F˜
F˜
V
.
2.4 Results
In this section we set out a firm’s objective function and the patenting game it is involved in.
We analyze this game, show when it is supermodular and derive comparative statics results.
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Given symmetry of technological opportunities (Assumption S) the expected value of
patenting for firm k in a technology area is:
πk(ok, fk) = ok
(
V (F˜ )sk − L(sk)− Co − fkpkCa
)
− Cc(ok) . (6)
Firms derive revenues from each technological opportunity and face costs of coordinating
R&D across different technological opportunities (Cc). Profits per technological opportunity
depend on the share of patents granted (sk), legal costs (L) as well as costs of R&D on the
technological opportunity (Co) and costs of maintaining granted patents (Ca).
Define a game G in which:
• There are N + 1 firms.
• Each firm simultaneously chooses the number of technological opportunities ok ∈ [0, O]
and the number of facets applied for per opportunity fk ∈ [0, F ], to maximize the payoff
function πk. Firms’ strategy sets Sn are elements of R
2.8
• Firms’ payoff functions πk, defined in equation (6), are twice continuously differen-
tiable and depend only on rivals’ aggregate strategies.
Firms’ payoffs depend on their rivals’ aggregate strategies because the probability of ob-
taining a patent on a given facet is a function of all rivals’ patent applications. Note that the
game is symmetric as it is exchangeable in permutations of the players. This implies that
symmetric equilibria exist if the game can be shown to be supermodular (Vives, 2005).9
In this game firms compete for granted patents on a technological opportunity. They pick
a certain number of technological opportunities and apply for patents on a share of the facets
in each opportunity. As rival firms’ applications increase, the probability of receiving a patent
grant decreases. However, rivals’ patent applications can be complementary to own applica-
tions as they can raise the overall value of technological opportunities in complex technolo-
gies. These two effects counteract one another: where the effect of rivalry dominates the
game is one of strategic substitutes, where the effect of the complementarity dominates the
game becomes a game of strategic complements. In particular we can show that:
Proposition 1
The game G is smooth supermodular if the technology is sufficiently complex, if there are
enough patenting firms and if the value of the marginal patent grant outweighs its administra-
tive cost.
This proposition contains three conditions for supermodularity: the first regards the number
of patentable facets per technological opportunity and the second the number of firms com-
peting for patents. We find that supermodularity is more likely to hold as both of these factors
8We treat ok and fk as continuous real numbers in the paper. Both determine probabilities: that a firm will
invest in specific technological opportunities in case of ok or facets in case of fk. These probabilities are defined
in Appendix A.
9Note also that only symmetric equilibria exist as the strategy spaces of players are completely ordered.
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increase. The third condition regards the marginal value of additional patents relative to ad-
ministrative costs. If the marginal gains are large enough the game is supermodular.
Where the game is supermodular we can characterize its comparative statics. In most cases
where the game is not supermodular the comparative statics will be difficult to characterize in
general.10 There is one important exception, that of a discrete technology. In that case there is
only one facet (F = 1) per technological opportunity. We characterize this important special
case at the end of this section. It can be shown that the comparative statics for that case differ
from those of the equilibria of the supermodular game.
To prove Proposition 1 we show in Appendix B that firms’ profit functions are supermod-
ular (i) in their own actions and (ii) in every combination of their own actions with those of
rival firms (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, Vives, 1999, 2005, Amir, 2005). This is the case if the
cross-partial derivatives between own as well as own and rival actions are positive, indicating
that all of these actions are strategic complements. We provide three intermediate results to
clarify conditions under which firms’ actions are strategic complements. The proofs of the
following lemmas is given in Appendix B. The first result is negative. We show that:
Lemma 1
In the absence of either administrative or legal costs game G is not supermodular.
The lemma clarifies that both administrative and legal costs provide a moderating effect for
firms’ patenting efforts. In the absence of either of these costs the game is not one of strategic
complements, in fact some of the firms’ actions may be strategic substitutes.11 However, these
costs do exist in all patent systems. In this case we find that:
Lemma 2
Given positive administrative and legal costs firms’ actions are strategic complements, if the
marginal value of additional patents exceeds their administrative costs.
This lemma shows that sufficiently high administrative costs can prevent strategic comple-
mentarity if the marginal value of a granted patent decreases in the number of covered patents.
Additionally, analysis of effects of rivals’ actions on the number of facets a firm seeks to
patent12 reveals:
Lemma 3
As the complexity of the technology increases and the number of rival firms grows, it is more
likely that firms’ actions are strategic complements.
This last lemma shows that the number of firms competing for patents on each technological
opportunity and the complexity of each technology affect how likely it is that firms’ actions
are strategic complements in the game G.
10In the model we analyze simultaneous optimization over two parameters. In the absence of supermodularity
a general characterization of comparative statics leads to the analysis of multiple implicit relations. We do not
pursue this line of analysis as it will require a host of additional assumptions.
11Our analysis shows that absent administrative or legal costs rivals’ actions are strategic substitutes for the
number of technological opportunities invested in. This emerges from analysis of equations (26) and (27).
12Compare equations (28) and (29) in Appendix B.
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There are two main implications that we can take away from these results. First, the model
shows that simultaneous competition for patents on various technological opportunities is not
necessarily characterized by strategic complementarities. We do not pursue those cases in
which there are no strategic complementarities, save for the important special case of discrete
technologies. Secondly, the conditions under which strategic complementarity is likely to
arise in our model fit our current understanding of settings in which patent thickets arise very
well. These are settings in which technologies are highly complex, in which many firms seek
to build large patent portfolios and in which the combination of multiple parties’ technologies
yields the best standards and products.
Comparative Statics of the Model
Here we provide comparative statics assuming that Proposition 1 holds. Throughout patenting
efforts refers to the choice of fk and ok. All derivations are provided in Appendix B. There we
begin with the following Corollary:
Corollary 1
If gameG is supermodular, firms’ patenting efforts increase in the number of competitors (N).
If firms’ actions are strategic complements, then additional competitors raise the number of
patents covered, increasing the expected value of all patents. At the same time the probability
of success on any given patent application will fall. Both of these effects reinforce firms’
patenting incentives and efforts. Additionally, we can show that:
Proposition 2
If game G is supermodular, firms’ patenting efforts fall with technological opportunity (O).
If firms’ actions are strategic complements, then greater technological opportunity reduces the
number of patents granted per technological opportunity and the value of each opportunity
while increasing the probability of success on any given patent application. Both of these
effects reduce firms’ patenting incentives and efforts. Finally, consider how greater techno-
logical complexity affects patenting:
Proposition 3
If game G is supermodular greater complexity increases firms’ patenting efforts.
Greater complexity of a technology has two effects. First, it increases the number of facets
per technological opportunity, which makes it easier to patent. Second, it reduces the share of
the value which a firm can secure with granted patents it already expects to hold. Both effects
lead firms to step up their patenting efforts.
Discrete Technologies We turn now to the case of a discrete technology where - by defi-
nition - F = 1. Additionally, legal costs of defending and exploiting a patent right are not
a function of the share of patents owned on a technological opportunity; this share is one by
10
definition. Similarly V does not depend on the level of applications made: one granted patent
application guarantees that a firm receives V . Then, firms’ payoffs can be simplified to:
πk = okV pk − okL− okCo − okpkCa − Cc(ok) . (7)
Define game G′ with this payoff function. This game is no longer supermodular: firms’
choices of the number of technological opportunities to invest in are strategic substitutes.
Note that the number of opportunities to invest in is also the number of facets invested in, as
F = 1. Therefore firms only have one choice variable here.
We can show that under the slightly stronger assumption that costs of coordinating techno-
logical opportunities (Cc(ok)) are strictly convex in the number of opportunities firms invest
in, we obtain a unique equilibrium for the game. We can demonstrate that:
Proposition 4
In a discrete technology, greater technological opportunity increases firms’ patenting efforts.
In a discrete technology firms’ choices of how many technological opportunities to invest in
are strategic substitutes because the value of each opportunity is not a function of the overall
level of patenting and because legal costs are constant. Then, greater technological opportunity
reduces the costs of patenting by raising the probability of obtaining a granted patent. This
increases patenting efforts. Notice that this result also implies that:
Corollary 2
In a discrete technology firms’ patenting efforts decrease in the number of competitors (N).
In this section we have shown that there can be countervailing patenting incentives in com-
plex and discrete technologies. This results from the fact that patenting efforts are strategic
substitutes in a discrete technology whilst they become strategic complements in a complex
technology. Strategic complementarity arises if there are sufficient numbers of competing
firms, if complexity is high enough and if additional patented facets of a technological oppor-
tunity add value. Our model implies that firms’ patenting incentives in complex technologies
and in discrete technologies differ profoundly. In particular, in complex technologies an in-
crease of complexity raises patenting incentives, while increasing technological opportunity
lowers them. In a discrete technology, richer technological opportunity leads to an increase in
patenting activity.
3 Data set and Variables
The model developed in the previous section suggests that technological opportunity and com-
plexity of technology jointly affect firms’ patenting behavior. In order to test the predictions of
the model developed above we derive measures of technological opportunities and complexity
from European patent data. We exploit information on blocking patents provided in these data
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to derive a new continuous measure of complexity of technologies. This information is also
used to construct a measure of fragmentation.13
Our empirical analysis is based on the PATSTAT database (“EPOWorldwide Patent Statis-
tical Database”) provided by the EPO.14 We extracted all patent applications filed at the EPO
between 1980 and 2003: more than 1,5 million patent applications with about 4.5 million
referenced documents. Patents are classified using the IPC classification, allowing us to ana-
lyze differences in patenting activities across different technologies. The categorization used
is based on an updated version of the OST-INPI/FhG-ISI technology classification15 which
divides the domain of patentable technologies into 30 distinct technology areas.16 We also
classify all technology areas as discrete or complex as suggested by Cohen et al. (2000).
Below we discuss measures of patenting, technological opportunities and complexity.
These are the most important variables needed to test the theoretical model. Additionally,
we discuss variables that are used as controls in the empirical model presented in Section 5.
Measures of Patenting, Complexity and Technological Opportunity
Number of Patent Applications We compute the number of patent applications Akat filed
by applicant k and year t separately for all of the 30 OST-INPI/FhG-ISI technology areas a. To
aggregate patent applications to the firm level two challenges must be overcome: firm names
provided in PATSTAT are occasionally misspelled, or different acronyms are used for parts
of the firm names. Moreover, subsidiaries of larger firms are not identified in the data set.
Therefore, we clean applicant names and consolidate ownership structures.17 The aggrega-
tion of patent applications are based on these consolidated applicant identities. The variables
discussed below are also based on this consolidation. Due to the skew distribution of patent
applications as measured by Akat we transform the variable logarithmically to derive a depen-
dent variable for the empirical analysis.
Technological Opportunity In our model, we establish a clear relationship between firms’
patenting levels in complex technologies and the extent of technological opportunities. Un-
fortunately, a direct (and time-variant) measure of technological opportunities does not exist.
To fill this gap, we use a proxy measure that is based on the number of non-patent literature
references in the search report of the patent. In the search report, the EPO examiner lists
patent and non-patent references which allow her to assess the degree novelty and of inventive
step of the invention described in the patent application. Non-patent literature consists largely
13The effects of fragmentation do not emerge directly from our model. We discuss the rationale of controlling
for this variable below.
14We use the September 2006 version of PATSTAT.
15See OECD (1994), p. 77
16These are listed in Table 8 in the appendix.
17We would like to thank Bronwyn Hall for providing us with code for name consolidation. Ownership
information was extracted from the Amadeus database and other sources. Detailed information on the cleaning
and aggregation algorithms can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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of scientific papers. A high number of such references reflects strong science-based research
efforts, and a significant inflow of new technological opportunities, leading to a relatively high
level of such opportunities for invention processes. The number of non-patent references can
thus be used as a good proxy for the strength of the science link of a technology as a num-
ber of studies have pointed out (Meyer, 2000, Narin and Noma, 1985, Narin et al., 1997).
Callaert et al. (2006) show that EPO patents contain a high proportion of scientific articles
among non-patent references, making European patent data a good source for this measure
of technological opportunity. We use the average number of non-patent references (NPR) per
patent in a technology area as a proxy for the position of a technology area in the technology
cycle and hence as a measure of technological opportunities.
In the theoretical model an increase in technological opportunity reduces competition for
remaining facets in complex technologies. This has the effect of reducing the level of patent-
ing. The measure of technological opportunity presented here will capture this effect as long
as the number of patents that can be obtained from older technological opportunities does
not change significantly and systematically in the opposite direction to the level of non-patent
references. We are not aware of any reason to expect such systematic changes.18
Complexity of Technology Areas The distinction between discrete and complex technolo-
gies is widely accepted in the literature (Cohen et al., 2000, Kusonaki et al., 1998, Hall, 2005a).
Discrete technologies are characterized by a relatively strong product-patent link (pharmaceu-
ticals or chemistry) whereas in complex technology industries products incorporate technol-
ogy protected by many patents. Due to the multiplicity of relevant patents hold-up is much
more likely in complex technologies than in discrete ones (Shapiro, 2001).
Despite the widely used notion of technological complexity there is no direct measure of it
nor is there an indirect construct related to complexity. Kusonaki et al. (1998) and Cohen et al.
(2000) (footnote 44) provide schemes which classify industries as discrete or complex based
on ISIC codes. These classification schemes are based on qualitative evidence gathered by the
authors from various sources in order to separate different industrial sectors into complex or
discrete areas. A major drawback of a classification based on prior information from industry
codes is that is does not allow to analyze the influence of different levels of complexity but
only to distinguish between discrete and complex industries.
An ideal measure of complexity should link patents to characteristics of products, showing
how many patents are incorporated in each product and how frequently products incorporate
patents of rival firms. This measure would yield precise information about overlapping patent
portfolios and the potential for hold-up. The measure should also cover products that do not
reach the market due to hold-up. The information necessary for such a measure is only very
rarely available and not available consistently across technology areas and through time. How-
18In fact, the time-series graph of non-patent references in semiconductors closely mirrors, but anticipates, the
time series graph of various measures of the speed of technological advance in semiconductors that are provided
by Aizcorbe et al. (2008). This indicates that non-patent references are a reliable indicator of technological
opportunity for this very important technology.
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ever, it is possible to come close to this ideal by measuring the similarity and overlap between
patents in specific technology areas. Where the subject matter covered by patents overlaps, the
potential for hold-up exists. This can be measured, albeit without information on the market
value of each case of overlap. To achieve this we use blocking dependencies among firms. If
patents containing prior art critical to the patentability of new inventions in a technology area
are held by two firms, each firm can block its rival’s use of the technology. Each firm can only
commercialize the technology if it receives a license to use the other’s blocking patents. In
technology areas in which products draw on many patents -complex technologies- we expect
to observe a larger number of such dependencies. In discrete technologies the inverse is true.
In our theoretical model the potential for hold-up exists as soon as each technological
opportunity consists of more than one facet and there are enough competitors relative to tech-
nological opportunities that dispersed ownership of patents within each technological oppor-
tunity is probable. Our model predicts more dispersed ownership of patents in technological
opportunities as competition increases and technology becomes more complex.
The examiners at the EPO determine and record the extent to which existing prior art limits
patentability of an invention in a search report which is typically released 18 months after the
priority date of the patent application (Harhoff et al., 2006). Critical documents containing
conflicting prior art are classified as X or Y references by the EPO patent examiner.19
If the patentability of a firm A’s inventions is frequently limited by existing patents of an-
other firm B, it is reasonable to assume that appropriation of rents by A can be blocked by B to
a certain degree. If the inverse is also true, A and B are in a mutual blocking relationship which
we call a blocking pair. If more than two firms own mutually blocking patents the complexity
of blocking relationships increases and resolution of blocking becomes increasingly costly. To
capture more complex structures of blocking we compute the number of triples in which three
firms mutually block each other’s patents for each technology area. Figure 2 illustrates this
measure.
The algorithm we use to calculate the pairs and triples is discussed in more detail in von
Graevenitz et al. (2009). There we also show that the level of triples in complex and discrete
technologies as defined by Cohen et al. (2000) is not driven by the level of patenting. Thus
the measure is not distorted by the different rates of patenting that have previously been doc-
umented for complex and discrete technologies (Hall, 2005a, von Graevenitz et al., 2007).
It is important to note that our measure is very weakly correlated (0.044) with measures of
dispersion of patent references such as the Fragmentation index discussed next.
Fragmentation of Prior Art Ziedonis (2004) shows that semiconductor firms increase their
patenting activities in situations where firms’ patent portfolios are fragmented. Ziedonis’
19A search report contains different types of references – not all of them are critical. Often, related patents
which are not critical are also included in the search report in order to describe the general state of the art in the
respective technology. These are then classified as A-type references. X-type references point to prior patents
that on their own cast doubt on the patent’s inventive step or novelty; Y-type references do the same, but only in
conjunction with additional documents. We have found that for our purposes the distinction between X and Y
references is not important and we aggregate them in our empirical analysis.
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Figure 2: Identification of our measures of a technology field’s complexity.
fragmentation index has predominantly been studied in complex industries (Ziedonis, 2004,
Schankerman and Noel, 2006) where increasing fragmentation raises firms’ patent applica-
tions. This is attributed to firms’ efforts to reduce potential hold-up by opportunistic patentees
owning critical or blocking patent rights – a situation which is associated with the existence of
patent thickets. This index does not measure hold-up potential as precisely as the complexity
measure we discuss above.
The complexity measure combines information on actual blocking relationships within
technological opportunities which the fragmentation index does not. The fragmentation index
captures the number of potential rivals across all technological opportunities in a technology
area. Therefore, the measures complement one another: triples capturing complexity, the
fragmentation index capturing the intensity of competition.20
We construct the index of fragmentation of patent ownership for each firm copying the
fragmentation index proposed by Ziedonis (2004):
Fragiat = 1−
n∑
j=1
s2ijt (8)
where sijt is firm i‘s share of critical references pointing to patents held by firm j. Following
Ziedonis (2004) we correct the index for a bias arising if firms have few patents (Hall (2005b)).
This index is based on the Herfindahl index of concentration. Small values of the frag-
mentation index indicate that prior art referenced in a firm’s patent portfolio is concentrated
among few rival firms and vice versa. For instance the measure takes the value zero, if all
references of one firm point to just one other firm. If the references of a firm are many and
highly dispersed, then the index approaches the value one. The more firms patent actively on
20In unreported results we find that the number of firms patenting in a technology area has a strong positive
correlation with the fragmentation index conditional on year and area fixed effects.
15
the same technological opportunities the greater the index is likely to be. Therefore, the index
proxies intensity of competition in a technology area (N in the theoretical model).
Unlike previous studies of patenting in complex technologies relying on USPTO patent
data (Ziedonis, 2004, Schankerman and Noel, 2006, Siebert and von Graevenitz, 2010) we
compute the fragmentation index solely from critical references which are classified as lim-
iting the patentability of the invention to be patented (X and Y references). This distinction
is not available in the USPTO data. Computing the fragmentation index based on critical
references will yield a more precise measure of direct competition for similar technologies.
Control Variables
Technological Diversity of R&D Activities A firm’s reaction to changing technological or
competitive characteristics in a given technology area might be influenced by its opportuni-
ties to strengthen its R&D activities in other fields. For example, if a firm is active in two
technology areas it might react by a concentration of its activities in one area if competition
in the other area is increasing. If a firm is active in only one technology area, it does not
possess similar possibilities to react to increases in competitive pressure. In order to control
for potential effects of opportunities to shift R&D resources we measure the total number of
technology areas (Areasi,t) with at least one patent application filed by firm i in year t.
Size Dummies. While we do not explicitly model the influence of firm size on patenting
behavior, it seems reasonable to assume that the cost of obtaining and upholding a patent
depends on the size of a firm. In particular, larger firms might face lower legal cost due
to economies of scale, increased potential to source in legal services and accumulation of
relevant knowledge which in turn might lead to a different patenting behavior than smaller
firms. For instance Somaya et al. (2007), find that the size of internal patent departments
positively influences firms’ patenting propensity.
If the economies-of-scale argument holds, the cost of patenting should not be directly
related to size characteristics such as a firm’s number of employees, its total revenues or sales.
Rather, the cost of patenting can be assumed to be a function of the total patents filed by a
firm. Therefore, we include a ’size dummy’ variable based on the number of patents filed by a
firm in a technology area in a given year in our regressions. We distinguish between small and
large patentees based on annual patent applications by area a. Firms belonging to the upper
half of the distribution of patentees in a given year are coded as large firms.
4 Descriptive Analysis of Patenting in Europe
In this section we provide descriptive aggregate statistics on patenting trends at the EPO. We
show that descriptive evidence on patenting supports the theoretical model. Also, the measure
of complexity is validated by a comparison with existing measures.
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Figure 3: Annual number of patent applications filed at the EPO by priority year. Note:
Black line (diamonds) indicates total patent applications. Blue line indicates patent applica-
tions in complex technology areas. Red line (starred) indicates patent applications in discrete
technology areas.
Figure 3 presents annual patent applications filed at the EPO between 1978 and 2003.
We distinguish applications filed in complex and discrete technology areas using the catego-
rization of Cohen et al. (2000). Patenting grew strongly over the period we plot, with the
main contribution coming from technology areas classified as complex. This development is
comparable to trends at the USPTO. Hall (2005a) shows that the strong increase in patent ap-
plications is is driven by firms patenting in the electrical, computing and instruments area all
of which are complex technology areas by the classification of Cohen et al. (2000).
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Figure 4: Average fragmentation index. Note: Blue line indicates average level of fragmen-
tation index in complex technology areas. Red line indicates average level of fragmentation
index in discrete technology areas.
Now consider explanations for the strong growth in patenting. First, in a complex technol-
ogy area fragmentation of patent rights is likely to raise firms’ transactions costs as they must
bargain with increasing numbers of rivals in order to prevent hold-up of their products. Ziedo-
nis (2004) and Schankerman and Noel (2006) show that increased fragmentation of patents
leads to greater patenting efforts in the semiconductor and software industries respectively.
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Figure 4 provides annual averages of the fragmentation index at the EPO for the years 1980
to 2003.21 Two observations derived from Figure 4 are striking: First, fragmentation of own-
ership rights increases steadily over the sample period (1988-2002). Second, the difference in
the fragmentation index in complex and discrete technology areas is negligible.
Both observations raise the question whether the growth in patent applications can be at-
tributed to fragmentation alone. While the development of fragmentation in complex and
discrete areas is almost identical we observe striking differences in the growth of patent appli-
cations between complex and discrete technology areas.
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Figure 5: Average number of triples identified. Note: The blue line indicates average number
of triples in complex technology areas. The red line (starred) indicates average number of
triples in discrete technology areas.
We can derive two separate explanations for the increase in patenting at the EPO from our
theoretical model: firstly, firms build patent portfolios to strengthen their bargaining positions
if complex bargaining situations are more likely to arise and secondly, the pressure to obtain
patents becomes more intense as technological opportunity declines.
First, the measure of mutual blocking between three and more firms (triples) captures the
degree to which complex blocking arises. In Figure 5 this measure is presented. The figure
presents annual averages of the number of triples in complex and in discrete areas.22 We ob-
serve very different developments of the count of triples in these technology areas. The num-
ber of triples is stable at values well under 10 in discrete technology areas, while it increases
strongly in complex technology areas. It is reassuring to see that this measure capturing com-
plex bargaining situations is greater in complex technologies as previously defined by Cohen
et al. (2000).
Table 1 below provides additional information on the distribution of triples across the 30
technology areas. It shows the significant hold-up potential, measured by triples, within ICT
technologies. There are between five and six times as many triples there as in other industries
such as Handling, Printing which still exhibit significant complexity by this measure.
21The precise definition of this measure is given in Section 3 above.
22We distinguish complex and discrete using the classification suggested by Cohen et al. (2000) here.
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Table 1: The Distribution of Triples Between 1988 and 2002
Technology area Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Electrical machinery, Electrical energy 24.23 20 8.99 10 42
Audiovisual technology 116.48 120 17.68 74 148
Telecommunications 99.64 93 39.17 27 166
Information technology 57.16 59 10.71 28 73
Semiconductors 62.84 63 17.89 26 91
Optics 57.30 58 12.02 42 77
Analysis, Measurement, Control 6.61 4 6.31 0 21
Medical technology 4.10 3 2.16 1 8
Nuclear engineering 0.95 1 1.17 0 4
Organic fine chemistry 3.77 2 4.03 0 15
Macromolecular chemistry, Polymers 16.00 14 8.17 4 32
Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics 3.47 4 2.68 0 8
Biotechnology 0.00 0 0.00 0 0
Agriculture, Food chemistry 0.07 0 0.26 0 1
Chemical and Petrol industry 11.16 10 5.49 4 22
Chemical engineering 1.35 1 0.87 0 3
Surface technology, Coating 3.48 3 2.82 0 9
Materials, Metallurgy 2.41 2 2.12 0 6
Materials processing, Textiles, Paper 3.92 3 2.73 1 9
Handling, Printing 20.26 16 13.55 4 50
Agricultural and Food processing, 0.35 0 0.71 0 2
Environmental technology 3.23 0 4.73 0 15
Machine tools 1.91 1 1.57 0 5
Engines, Pumps and Turbines 21.72 15 21.10 3 69
Thermal processes and apparatus 0.37 0 0.62 0 2
Mechanical elements 2.33 2 2.14 0 7
Transport 16.54 14 12.00 2 50
Space technology, Weapons 0.00 0 0.00 0 0
Consumer goods 0.72 0 1.05 0 4
Civil engineering, Building, Mining 0.00 0 0.00 0 0
Second, consider the development of technological opportunities as an explanation of the over-
all patenting trends. Proposition 2 indicates greater technological opportunity in a complex
technology should lower the pressure to patent. As noted in Section 3 we measure techno-
logical opportunity using changes in the rate of references to non patent literature within a
technology area. This measure provides information about variation in technological oppor-
tunities between and across technology areas. The left panel of Figure 6 below shows a hump
shaped pattern for technological opportunities in complex technology industries. In contrast,
technological opportunities in discrete technologies also level off, but at a later date then in
complex technologies. Note that technological opportunities in complex technology areas be-
gan to decline just after 1992, which coincides with the date at which the growth in patent
applications at the EPO picked up as Figure 3 shows. The right panel of the Figure shows
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that average non patent references in complex technology areas mask considerable variation
across and especially within technologies.
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Figure 6: The left panel presents average non patent references per patent for complex (blue
line) and discrete (red line, starred) technology areas. The right panel presents average non
patent references per patent for several complex technology areas.
5 The Empirical Model and Results
In this section we set out empirical results. To begin with we provide a discussion of our
empirical model and discuss descriptives for the sample used. Then we turn to the results
from estimation and a discussion of their implications.
5.1 An Empirical Model of Patenting
Building on the results of Section 2 we estimate a reduce form model predicting the level of
patent applications filed by a firm in a given year at the EPO. Patent applications are highly
persistent as they reflect long term investments in R&D capacity. Therefore, we include a
lagged dependent variable in our model. We estimate the following dynamic relationship:23
Ai,t = β0 + βAAi,t−1 + βACAi,t−1Ci,t + βOOi,t + βCCi,t + βOCOi,tCi,t (9)
+ βFFi,t + βFCFi,tCi,t + βX
′X i,t +Υi + ζi,t ,
where:
Ai,t − ln(Patent Applications) Oi,t − Technological Opportunity: Non Patent References
Ci,t − Complexity: Triples Fi,t − Fragmentation index: Concentration
X i,t − Control variables: Area count, Size
Υi − Firm area fixed effects ζi,t − Error term.
23Our model did not explicitly account for dynamic aspects of firms’ strategic decisions. However, it seems
appropriate to take the persistent nature of patenting decision into account when analyzing patenting over time.
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With this specification we capture effects of technological opportunity βO, complexity βC
and competition βF as well as the effects of complexity and competition in complex technolo-
gies (βOC , βFC). We also allow the effect of the lagged dependent variable to differ in complex
and discrete technology areas (βAC).
In an extension of this basic specification we also include interaction terms that allow us
to distinguish the patenting behavior of large and small firms in complex and discrete tech-
nologies. Our theoretical model indicates that firms’ patenting behavior will depend on the
share of patents they expect to receive on a given technological opportunity which may differ
systematically between large and small firms.
Estimates of this specification provide a test of the following hypotheses. These reflect
Propositions 2- 4 and Corollaries 1- 2:
H1 Greater complexity of technologies raises patent applications, βC > 0 (Proposition 3);
H2 Competition raises patent applications in complex technologies, βFC > 0 (Corollary 1);
H3 Technological opportunity reduces patent applications in complex technologies, βOC <
0 (Proposition 2);
H4 Competition reduces patent applications in discrete technologies, βF < 0 (Corollary 2);
H5 Technological opportunity raises patent applications in discrete technologies, βO > 0
(Proposition 4).
Hypotheses 1-3 capture the effects of complexity, competition and technological opportu-
nity in complex technologies. Proposition 1 shows that greater complexity of a technology is
more likely to render firms’ actions in a patenting game strategic complements. The reverse
is true in a discrete technology, here firms actions are strategic substitutes and the compara-
tive statics with respect to competition and technological opportunity are exactly reversed. By
interacting complexity with the number of competing firms and our measure of technological
opportunity in Hypotheses 2 and 3 we separate the two types of equilibria.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Sample
Our data set contains observations of patent applications by firms in specific technology areas
and covers the period between 1978 when the EPO began operating and 2003. We intend to
study patent applicants patenting over a prolonged period and possibly across several technol-
ogy areas. Therefore, we excluded small patentees from the sample. Two criteria were used:
first, we excluded all those patentees with fewer than 100 patent applications between 1980
and 2002. Second, we excluded those patentees who had fewer than three years of positive
patent applications in a technology area in the fifteen years after 1987.
These criteria result in a sample containing 173,448 observations of patenting activity by
a firm in a technology area. Table 2 shows that these patent applications are due to 2074
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distinct firms. The average size of these firms’ patent portfolios in 2002 was 628 patents
resulting from an average of 37 patent applications per firm and year across all technology
areas. 34% of observations in the data set contain a zero patent application count but only
0.05% of observations belong to firms that have no patent applications at all in a given year.
The lower half of Table 2 shows that our sample covers on average 55.8% of the annual mean
of 2594 patent applications filed within an average technology area. As the sample focuses on
large patentees the share of firms we covered by the sample is smaller: on average 1077 firms
patent per area per year and 24.8% of these are included in the sample.24
Table 2: Panel Descriptives for the Sample
Firm level (2074 firms) Mean Median SD
Total patents 628.27 205 1944.94
Total patents (annual) 37.02 12 111.65
Technological areas (annual) 5.54 4 4.56
Area-Year level (650 area-year observations) Mean Median SD
Total patents in area 2594.23 2310 1778.87
Total patents in area and sample 1449.35 1012 1695.86
Total firms in area 1077.62 893 668.14
Total firms in area and sample 266.84 263 253.71
Triples 14.67 2 27.69
Non Patent References 0.98 0.75 0.75
Fragmentation 0.05 0.05 0.03
Firms operating in several technology areas are treated as distinct in each area. Hence,
our panel structure is not defined over firms’ total patent applications per year (firm-years) but
over firms’ annual patent applications within specific technology areas (firm-area-years). We
do this to control for area specific patenting behavior of individual firms and its relation to
area characteristics like complexity.25 Where we use panel data, the panel is unbalanced due
to entry and exit of firms into technology areas.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics at the firm-area-year level. Most firms in the sam-
ple patent relative broadly across technology areas. While the number of patent applications
within a given technology area is relatively low with 5.43 application per year firms are active
in 8 or 9 different technology areas. The average technology area contained about 18.5 triples
in a given year – however the distribution is skew with a median of 5 and a maximum of 166
triples (observed in Telecommunications in 2000). The level of non patent references in the
average technology area is 1.151. Table 3 also contains information about sample statistics
24We have experimented with alternative sample selection rules and found our results to be robust.
25We find that firms in more complex technologies are very slightly more likely to be active in more technology
areas than the average firm, with a very weak positive correlation of 0.04.
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for the year 1992, after which patent applications increased markedly as Figure 3 shows. A
comparison of sample means (upper part of Table 3) and means for 1992 (lower part of 3)
shows that firms patent in more areas, face more complexity (triples) and generate fewer non
patent references after 1992 than before. This confirms what we showed previously.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample (1988-2002)
Variable Aggregation Mean Median Standard Mini- Maxi-
level deviation mum mum
Patent applications per area Firm 5.431 1.000 18.594 0.000 752.000
log Patent applications per area Firm 1.051 0.693 1.052 0.000 6.624
Areas Firm 8.751 7.000 6.027 0.000 30.000
Large dummy Firm 0.504 1.000 - 0.000 1.000
Non Patent References Area 1.151 0.894 0.827 0.174 4.532
Triples Area 18.480 5.000 30.085 0.000 166.000
Fragmentation Firm 0.210 0.000 0.427 0.000 1.961
Observations = 173,448
Sample statistics for 1992
Patent applications per area Firm 4.235 1.000 14.024 0.000 387.000
log Patent applications p/a Firm 0.923 0.693 0.990 0.000 5.961
Areas Firm 7.746 6.000 5.563 0.000 27.000
Large dummy Firm 0.438 0.000 - 0.000 1.000
Non Patent References Area 1.205 0.970 0.747 0.290 3.554
Triples Area 15.761 3.000 25.348 0.000 104.000
Fragmentation Firm 0.175 0.000 0.389 0.000 1.935
Observations = 11,325
5.3 Results
In this section we present results from estimation of the empirical model (Equation 9) us-
ing GMM. The lagged dependent variable and several explanatory variables which may be
expected to be endogenous are instrumented. We show that the predictions of the theoretical
model in Section 2 are supported by the data.
We use panel estimators to avoid misspecification of the empirical model arising from
unobserved heterogeneity, such as variation in managerial ability. To capture persistence in
patenting we introduce a lagged dependent variable into our models, which introduces an
additional source of misspecification. This renders fixed and random effects estimators in-
consistent in short panels such as ours (Arellano, 2003). Instead, we employ system GMM
estimators which also allow us to address the potential endogeneity of some of our regressors.
23
Table 4: GMMModels for Patent Applications
Variable SGMM A SGMM B SGMM C SGMM D SGMM E
log Patentcountt−1 0.720*** 0.509*** 0.426*** 0.688*** 0.749***
(0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.122) (0.093)
log Patentcountt−1× Triples -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003)
Non Patent References (NPR) 0.226*** 0.121*** -0.152* 1.700*** 1.553***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.061) (0.344) (0.254)
NPR × Triples 0.001 -0.043*** -0.036***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.006)
NPR × Triples × Large 0.007***
(0.002)
NPR × Large -0.366***
(0.081)
Fragmentation 0.641*** 0.793*** -0.489* -0.474**
(0.065) (0.064) (0.213) (0.170)
Fragmentation × Triples 0.010 0.006
(0.006) (0.006)
Triples -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.071*** 0.055***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.010)
Areas 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.073*** 0.105*** 0.096***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012)
Large -0.079** -0.117*** -0.183*** 0.010 0.342**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.078) (0.117)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Primary area dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.403*** -0.221*** 0.044 -1.700*** -1.443***
(0.038) (0.043) (0.062) (0.314) (0.319)
N 173448 173448 173448 173448 173448
m1 -25.041 -23.908 -23.413 -7.934 -10.860
m2 18.356 13.590 10.836 3.131 4.739
m3 -1.707 -2.230 -2.285 1.606 .896
Hansen 525.187 412.714 456.374 19.221 10.988
p-value 9.1e-115 3.90e-89 2.08e-95 .004 .052
Degrees of freedom 2 3 6 6 5
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
1. Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses
2. m1-m3 are tests for first- to third-order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals.
3. Hansen is a test of overidentifying restrictions. It is distributed as χ2 under the null of instrument
validity, with degrees of freedom reported below.
4. In all cases GMM instrument sets were collapsed and lags were limited.
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We instrument potentially endogenous variables such as the number of areas a firm is active
in using lagged values. Exogeneity of these instruments is tested using difference in Hansen
tests (Roodman, 2006).
Table 4 presents results of system GMM estimators using forward deviations transforma-
tions (Blundell and Bond, 1998, Arellano and Bover, 1995, Alvarez and Arellano, 2003).26
Reported standard errors are based on two step estimators using the correction suggested by
Windmeijer (2005). Tests for first, second and third order serial correlation (m1-m3) indi-
cate presence of first and second order serial correlation. In all specifications we instrument
predetermined variables with third order lags and endogenous variables with fourth order lags.
Instrument sets are collapsed27 in order to reduce the number of instruments used. Through-
out we rely on the Hansen test to determine whether the instruments we use are truly exoge-
nous. Where the statistic indicates that this is not the case we reject the models.
Specification SGMMA contains the lagged dependent variable, measures of technological
opportunity (Non Patent References (NPR)), complexity (triples), the breadth of a firms’ activ-
ities within the patent system (Areas), a dummy for the size of a firms’ patent portfolio (Large)
and dummies for year and main technology area. Specification SGMM B adds the measure of
fragmentation suggested by Ziedonis (2004). This is adjusted as proposed by Hall (2005b). In
specification SGMM C we add interactions of the complexity measure (triples) with the mea-
sure of technological opportunity (NPR). Hansen tests for these simple specifications reject
their validity, indicating that the instruments used are not exogenous.
In specification SGMMD triples are interacted with the lagged dependent variable, to cap-
ture the possibility that firms adjust their levels of patenting differently in complex and discrete
technologies. This specification performs better than SGMM A-C, the χ2 statistic being sig-
nificantly lower than for those specifications. Finally, specification SGMM E also includes
interactions which test the effects of firm size on non patent references. This specification
performs best, the Hansen test does not reject the model. We now focus on this model.
We find that greater technological opportunities (NPR) raise patenting levels showing that
we cannot reject Hypothesis 5. The effect of technological opportunity is highly significant
across almost all estimated specifications (see models (A) to (E) of Table 4). The inclusion
of the interaction between our measure of complexity (triples) and technological opportunities
shows that the effect differs in discrete - and complex technologies. In particular, if the number
of triples in a technology area is larger than 39 (in specification (D) ) or larger than 43 in
specification (E) of Table 4, the overall effect from increasing technological opportunities is
negative as βO+βOC×Ci,t < 0. The negative coefficient on the interaction of complexity and
non patent references supports Hypothesis 3: increasing technological opportunities reduce
patenting efforts in more complex technology areas. Additionally, the significant positive
coefficient on the effects of complexity alone supports Hypothesis 1.
Table 1 shows the average number of triples for 5 technology areas in our sample is greater
26All models were estimated with xtabond2 in Stata 9.2 . This package is described in Roodman (2006).
27Collapsing instrument sets reduces the number of moment conditions used for GMM (Roodman (2006)).
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than 43. For Audiovisual technology and Optics triples are always above 43. This indicates
that increased technological opportunities always or almost always reduce patenting efforts in
these areas.
With regard to the effects of the number of competitors blocking a specific firm in tech-
nology space we fail to reject either Hypothesis 4, i.e. more competition (greater fragmenta-
tion) reduces patenting efforts in discrete technologies. The coefficient on the interaction of
fragmentation and complexity is not significant. However, the joint effect of fragmentation
and complexity is significant. Thus we have weak evidence that increased competition raises
patenting efforts in complex technologies (Hypothesis 2).
Finally, our results on the interaction of the lagged dependent variable with triples indicate
that persistence of patenting decreases as technology areas become more complex. Persistence
is entirely absent in very complex technologies. This shows that patentees are more responsive
to their competitors’ patenting behavior and to technological opportunity in complex technol-
ogy areas than in discrete technology areas.
Table 5 below provides effects of changes in complexity (triples), technological opportuni-
ties (Non patent references) and Fragmentation for patenting rates in nine technology areas.28
The table presents effects for small and large firms where appropriate and contains mean and
median results. Five of the technology areas presented are highly likely complex as the mean
and median levels of triples are clearly above 43 in these areas (viz. Table 1). They are
Audiovisual Technology, Telecommunications, Information Technology, Semiconductors and
Optics. We also present results for four additional areas. These are more likely discrete by
this measure: Medical Technology; Electrical Machinery; Analysis, Measurement, Control;
and Pharmaceuticals.
Table 5 shows that in all discrete technologies an increase in technological opportunity
raises patenting, while in all complex technology areas it lowers patenting. These results
fit the predictions of Hypotheses 5 and 3 respectively. Most importantly the effects of a one
standard deviation change in technological opportunity are comparatively large in the complex
technologies. This is a surprising finding that indicates that technological opportunity is an
important determinant of firms’ patenting efforts.
Hypothesis 1 states that increases in the complexity of a technology will raise firms’ levels
of patenting in the technology is complex. Table 5 shows this result generally holds at the
median and at the mean for large firms in complex technology areas apart from Semiconduc-
tors.29
Interestingly, Table 5 also shows that the effect of Fragmentation on firms’ patenting ef-
forts in very complex technology areas is positive as predicted by Hypothesis 2. Also, Frag-
mentation has a negative effect on patenting in discrete technology areas, as predicted in Hy-
28These effects are calculated taking account of the logarithmic transformation of the dependent and the lagged
dependent variable.
29The precise delineation of the areas for Information Technology and Semiconductors in the classification we
use is not clear. In von Graevenitz et al. (2007) we find that a large proportion of patents from semiconductor
firms are patented within the Information Technology area.
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pothesis 4. The positive effects for complex technology areas support the findings of Ziedonis
(2004), Schankerman and Noel (2006) who find that additional fragmentation of patent own-
ership increases patenting efforts in semiconductors and software in the United States. Note
however, that Fragmentation has small negative effects on patenting in the moderately com-
plex technologies included in Table 5. In discrete technology areas fragmentation has a very
strong negative effect so that overall we confirm the prediction that firms are more likely to
patent more as fragmentation increases if technology areas are more complex.
Table 5: Mean and Median Percentage Changes in Patent Applications
in Complex and Discrete Technologies
Applications Triples Triples Non patent references Fragmentation
Technology growth SD change SD change Unit change SD
area 1990-2000 Small Large Small Large change
Complex Technologies
Audiovisual 52% 118 -2.76% 10.13% -51.59% -45.21% 26.14% 10.65%
Technology 120 6.29% 20.47% -52.66% -46.19% 27.89% 11.32%
Telecom- 253% 103 -22.38% 4.80% -34.87% -30.11% 15.25% 6.83%
munications 93 -11.40% 18.14% -30.18% -26.08% 8.76% 3.99%
Semiconductors 63% 62 -33.51% -17.04% -23.19% -21.10% -9.48% -4.14%
63 -31.09% -13.51% -23.83% -21.62% -9.15% -3.99%
Information 174% 58 -8.11% 0.04% -9.75% -9.03% -11.63% -4.99%
Technology 59 -3.83% 4.69% -10.12% -9.33% -11.31% -4.85%
Optics 41% 57 -11.07% -0.49% -7.02% -6.54% -12.02% -5.55%
58 -6.16% 5.02% -7.18% -6.67% -11.84% -5.46%
Discrete Technologies
Analysis, 75% 25 -1.48% 3.87% 10.07% 7.53% -35.19% -17.83%
Measurement, 20 1.24% 6.63% 11.15% 8.38% -36.62% -17.87%
Control
Electrical 91% 7 7.97% 15.59% 4.28% 3.02% -27.83% -13.57%
Machinery 3 12.24% 20.27% 5.39% 3.90% -29.81% -14.64%
Pharmaceu- 221% 4 -15.60% -11.26% 55.06% 39.60% -36.38% -19.43%
ticals 4 -16.29% -11.93% 54.41% 39.13% -36.24% -19.49%
Medical 148% 4 6.00% 6.54% 5.81% 4.38% -36.16% -17.99%
Technology 4 6.62% 7.19% 5.84% 4.41% -36.24% -18.02%
This table reports means (upper row) and medians (lower row) for each technology area. We report changes
in patent applications in response to standard deviation (SD) changes in each variable. For Triples and Non patent
references we report effects for small and large firms.
5.4 Robustness of the Results
In a next step, we test the robustness of our results using alternative GMM estimators. Results
from these tests are reported in Table 6. We vary size of the instrument set and the estimator
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Table 6: Robustness Checks for Patent Applications Estimates
Allowing correlation Assuming no correlation
with fixed effects with fixed effects
Variable SGMM F SGMM E DGMM G SGMM H SGMM I SGMM J
log Patentcountt−1 0.675*** 0.749*** 0.935*** 0.617*** 0.742*** 0.879***
(0.102) (0.093) (0.110) (0.067) (0.047) (0.054)
log Patentcountt−1× Triples -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Non Patent References (NPR) 1.880*** 1.553*** 1.502*** 0.654*** 0.475*** 1.306***
(0.361) (0.254) (0.258) (0.112) (0.039) (0.173)
NPR × Triples -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.031***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
NPR × Triples × Large 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NPR × Large -0.248* -0.366*** -0.224*** -0.373*** -0.484*** -0.557***
(0.125) (0.081) (0.040) (0.057) (0.036) (0.049)
Fragmentation -0.558** -0.474** -0.490** -0.091 -0.007 -0.183
(0.211) (0.170) (0.164) (0.111) (0.081) (0.113)
Fragmentation × Triples 0.009 0.006 0.000 -0.004 -0.007* -0.000
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Triples 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.059***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Areas 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.036* 0.098*** 0.082*** 0.090***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Large 0.221 0.342** 0.256*** 0.349*** 0.562*** 0.562***
(0.165) (0.117) (0.065) (0.083) (0.060) (0.080)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Primary area dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -1.311** -1.443*** -0.703*** -0.886*** -2.000***
(0.466) (0.319) (0.194) (0.075) (0.206)
N 173448 173448 171380 173448 173448 173448
m1 -9.878 -10.860 -8.276 -12.868 -19.934 -20.345
m2 2.651 4.739 4.881 6.166 11.269 14.863
m3 1.353 .896 .192 -1.051 -.951 .3055
Hansen 4.101 10.988 5.177 57.671 197.573 52.158
p-value .129 .052 .270 3.76e-09 2.07e-38 5.43e-09
Degrees of freedom 2 5 4 9 8 7
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
1. Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses
2. m1-m3 are tests for first- to third-order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals.
3. Hansen is a test of overidentifying restrictions. It is distributed as χ2 under the null of instrument
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validity, with degrees of freedom reported below.
4. In all cases GMM instrument sets were collapsed and lags were limited.
used. All models reported in Table 6 are estimated using forward deviations and reported stan-
dard errors corrected as previously noted. The models differ in the number of overidentifying
restrictions employed as well as assumptions about the correlation of the explanatory variables
with fixed effects. Hansen tests are used to determine which of the models are reliable. These
show that only the first three models reported in the table are not rejected.
The four models reported in the central part of Table 6 allow for correlation between all
explanatory variables with fixed effects. In two specifications on the right side of the table we
assume subsets of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with fixed effects. The number
of observations in our data set implies that T/N → 0. Therefore, a systems GMM estimator
(Blundell and Bond, 1998) using forward deviations is asymptotically consistent (Alvarez and
Arellano, 2003, Hayakawa, 2006). We employ this estimator as the patenting series are highly
persistent in our sample: the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in an AR1 model
with time and primary area dummies is 0.92. Blundell and Bond (1998) note that difference
GMM is affected by a weak instruments problem in this context which is not the case in the
specificatio we report. However, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is somewhat
above that reported for the comparable systems estimators. It is also significantly above the
coefficients from the OLS regressions reported in Table 7. Therefore, we focus our analysis
on the results from the system estimators.
In all models reported in Table 6 the instrument sets were collapsed and instrumenting
lags were limited as described below. This was done as the Hansen test and difference in
Hansen tests rejected the overall instrument sets as well as individual instruments where larger
instrument sets were employed. Specification SGMM H illustrates how sensitive the Hansen
test is to the size of the instrument set here. This specification is identical to SGMM E, we just
allow for an extra lag on the instrument sets for the endogenous variables in this specification.
The specification is rejected by the Hansen test.
All models reported in Table 6 contain the following explanatory variables: Non patent
references, triples, Fragmentation, Area count, Large dummy and the lagged dependent vari-
able as well as interactions of some of these variables. We consider Fragmentation and Area
count to be endogenous as they reflect decisions about how widely and where to engage in
research which may be contemporaneous with decisions determining the level of patent appli-
cations. We consider the remaining variables to be predetermined since they depend in large
part on the aggregated decisions of rival firms. Finally note that we include only year and
primary area dummies in the levels equation as it is likely that the fixed effects are correlated
with differences in the remaining explanatory variables.
We estimate two models in which we treat Fragmentation (SGMM J) and Non patent
references (SGMM I) as uncorrelated with fixed effects. Results from the Hansen tests for
both specifications reported in Table 6 show that these models are clearly rejected.
Our preferred models are reported as SGMM F and SGMM E in Table 6. In SGMM F we
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restrict the number of instruments such that the model is just overidentified. Hayakawa (2006)
argues that such a minimum instruments specification is unbiased in settings where T is fixed
and N → ∞. Specification SGMM E includes additional instruments for the endogenous
variables. Results from these two specifications are statistically indistinguishable.
Additionally to the GMM results reported here, Table 7 (Appendix C) provides results
from OLS on the pooled sample and from fixed effects regressions. These results are known
to be biased due to inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. However, they provide lower
and upper bounds on the values of the lagged dependent variable for GMM (Bond (2002)).
Once we take account of the interaction of the lagged dependent variable with triples we find
that the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are within the range provided by OLS
and fixed effects estimates for technology areas of average complexity.
6 Conclusion
Patent applications have been increasing steeply at the USPTO and the EPO since 1984 and
1992 respectively. In both cases these increases have raised questions about the operations of
the affected patent offices as well as effects of these trends on economic activity more gen-
erally (Federal Trade Commission, 2003, National Research Council, 2004, von Graevenitz
et al., 2007, Bessen and Meurer, 2008). Our paper makes a number of contributions towards
a systematic explanation of these phenomena. There is strong evidence by now that patent-
ing has increased in response to evolution of the legal environment, specifically in the United
States, to changes in the management of R&D and patenting, and to increasing complexity of
technology and more strategic behavior of patent applicants (Kortum and Lerner, 1998, Hall
and Ziedonis, 2001, Ziedonis, 2004). But the contribution of technological opportunity to cur-
rent patenting trends and its interaction with other determinants has been less well understood.
This latter effect is central to our analysis. Our model is the first to consider the effect
of complexity and of technological opportunity jointly. Moreover, while other studies have
focused on selected industries, our model and the empirical test encompass discrete and com-
plex technologies, providing predictions for patenting behavior in both types of technology.
We show theoretically that greater technological opportunity will raise patenting in discrete
technologies but will lower it as technologies become increasingly complex. Additionally, we
show that greater competition in R&D raises firms’ patenting levels in complex technologies.
To test our model we derive a new measure of complexity of blocking relationships in
patent thickets. This measure exploits information on critical references to capture mutual
blocking between the patent portfolios of firms contained in European patent data. Using the
measure we are able to confirm that blocking is a much more serious problem in technology
areas previously identified as complex than in those previously identified as discrete.
Using data on patenting in Europe and these measures, we find that patenting behavior
largely conforms to the predictions of our theoretical model. Most importantly, we find that
variation in technological opportunity strongly affected firms’ patenting levels. Our data show
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that increased technological opportunity during the early 1990’s counteracted the effects of
growing complexity and retarded the onset of the patenting explosion observable after 1994.
The patent explosion coincides with the decrease in technological opportunities after 1994.
We also show - for the first time with European data - that greater fragmentation of patent
ownership increases patenting in complex technologies (Ziedonis, 2004). We attribute this
to a greater number of competing patent applicants as we control for the degree of hold-up
potential with the triples measure of complexity of the technology.
Finally, our results show that as technology areas become more complex, firms patenting
activities increase. As we use lagged values of complexity to instrument current complexity
this finding is likely to reflect a causal mechanism - as firms encounter more complexity they
respond by patenting more.
We are able to show that patent thickets exist in nine out of thirty technology areas at the
EPO. The data we use indicate that the extent of patent thickets at the EPO has been increasing
in recent years. These increases are concentrated in complex technology areas (Hall, 2005a,
von Graevenitz et al., 2007). Resulting increases in transactions costs would therefore affect
exactly those technologies that have been central to large productivity increases in the recent
past (Jorgenson and Wessner, 2007). Extended ”patent wars” may threaten this source of
productivity gains in the long run. In future work we therefore intend to investigate whether
strategic patenting has measurable effects on the productivity of firms’ R&D investments and
how the decision variables of patent offices (fees and administrative rules) might be used to
influence patent filings.
Our findings on the effects of technological opportunity raise important questions about
the relationship between patent breadth, the fecundity of research areas and firms’ R&D in-
vestments. We find that the contest for patent rights becomes more intense as the level of
technological opportunities decreases if a technology is complex. This raises the question
how firms’ incentives to patent more intensively interact with incentives to undertake basic re-
search which might stem the reduced fecundity of these technologies. At a more fundamental
level the findings indicate that research into the relationship between technological opportuni-
ties and R&D is important if we are to understand the welfare implications of recent patenting
trends better.
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Appendix
A Technical Appendix for the Theoretical Model
In this section we derive several of the results which we make use of in deriving our theoret-
ical predictions in Section 2. In particular we describe the functions describing the expected
number of facets covered F˜ and the probability of patenting a facet pk.
Note that below we also employ the following definitions:
ωk ≡ ok
/
O φk ≡ fk
/
F . (10)
A.1 The Expected Number of Rival Investors
Here we derive the expected number of rival firms NO that undertake R&D on the same tech-
nology opportunity as firm k. This expected number of rivals can be expressed as a sum
of products. Each product gives the probability that a given number of rivals invest in the
same technological opportunity. All of these probabilities are then summed to give the overall
expected number of rival firms on a given technological opportunity:
NO =
(
N
1
)
ωj(1− ωj)
N−1 + 2
(
N
2
)
ω2j (1− ωj)
N−2 + 3
(
N
3
)
ω3j (1− ωj)
N−3...
=
N∑
i=0
i
(
N
i
)N−i∏
j=0
(1− ωj)
i∏
l=0
ωl (11)
It can be shown thatNO is increasing in ω. First rewriteNO as a function of a firmm’s choice
ωm and ωk, ωl:
NO =
N−1∑
i=0
[(1− ωm)i+ ωm(i+ 1)]
(
N − 1
i
)N−1−i∏
j=0
(1− ωj)
i∏
l=0
ωl (12)
Next we take the derivative:
∂NO
∂ωk
=
N−1∑
i=0
ωm
(
N − 1
i
)N−1−i∏
j=0
(1− ωj)
i∏
l=0
ωl > 0 . (13)
An increase in the number of opportunities oj which other firms invest in, increases the ex-
pected number of rivals patenting facets on the same technological opportunity.
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A.2 The Expected Number of Facets Covered
The expected number of facets covered through the joint efforts of all firms investing in a
technological opportunity is:30
F˜ = F
[
1− (1− φk)
NO∏
j=1
(1− φj)
]
(14)
As noted above, the derivatives of this expression with respect to F and fk are important
for the results there. Both of these can be shown to be positive:
∂F˜
∂F
= 1− (1− φj)
NO (1 + φjNO) ≥ 0 ,
∂F˜
∂fk
=
NO∏
j=1
(1− φj) > 0 , (15)
where we impose symmetry in the choice of f across firms in the derivative w.r.t. F . This
derivative is used for comparative statics purposes, after first derivatives have been taken.
Finally note that the elasticities of F˜ with respect to F and f˜i are:
ǫF˜ fk =φk
[∏NO
j=1(1− φj)
]
1− (1− φk)
∏NO
j=1(1− φj)
, (16)
ǫF˜F =
1− (1− φj)
NO (1 + φjNO)
1− (1− φj)(NO+1)
, (17)
which shows that 1 ≥ ǫF˜F ≥ 0 as the denominator in the fraction is always greater than the
numerator. It is useful to observe that the upper bound of the elasticity ǫF˜ fk is decreasing in
NO. To see this note that in equilibrium the elasticity is defined as:
ǫF˜ fk =φj
(1− φj)
NO
1− (1− φj)NO+1
=
(1− φj)
NO
(No + 1)
(
1− φj
No
2!
+ φ2j
No(NO−1)
3!
...
) . (18)
The second expression above makes clear that the upper bound of the ealsticity decreases in
NO: limφj→0 ǫF˜ fk = 1
/
(NO+1). Here we make use of the binomial expansion of (1−φj)
No+1.
From this expression it is also clear that the lower bound of the elasticity is always zero.
A.3 The Probability of Patenting a Facet
Now turn to the probability of obtaining a patent on a facet given NO:
pk =
NO∏
j=1
(1− φj) +
NO
2
· φj
NO−1∏
j=1
(1− φj) +
(NO)(NO − 1)
6
NO−2∏
j=1
(1− φj)
NO∏
l=NO−2
(φl)... ,
30We are grateful for the help of Professor Helmut Ku¨chenhoff and Mr. Fabian Scheipl in deriving this ex-
pression.
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=NO∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
(
NO
i
)NO−i∏
j=0
(1− φj)
i∏
l=0
φl (19)
The properties of this expression are not easily derived. Here we set out the derivative of
pk w.r.t. φ and we show that pk decreases in NO.
Consider first the effects of an increase in φm, i.e. an increase in the proportion of facets
covered by firm m on the probability that firm k obtains a given facet. To investigate this we
reexpress the probability of obtaining a facet as follows:
pk =
[
NO−1∑
i=0
[
(1− φm)
1
i+ 1
+ φm
1
(i+ 2)
](NO − 1
i
)NO−1−i∏
j=0
(1− φj)
i∏
l=0
φl
]
(20)
Then the derivative is:
∂pk
∂φm
=
[
NO−1∑
i=0
[
−
1
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
](NO − 1
i
)NO−1−i∏
j=0
(1− φj)
i∏
l=0
φl
]
< 0 . (21)
Finally consider the effects of an increase in NO on the probability of patenting a facet:
pi(NO + 1)− pi(NO) =
NO∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
(
NO
i
)NO−i∏
j=1
(1− φj)
i∏
j=0
φj
−
NO−1∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
(
NO − 1
i
)NO−1−i∏
j=1
(1− φj)
i∏
j=0
φj
=
[
NO−1∑
i=0
(−φj)
1
i+ 1
(
NO − 1
i
)NO−1−i∏
j=1
(1− φj)
i∏
j=0
φj
]
+
1
NO + 1
φNOj ≤ 0
(22)
We also plot the function, allowing φ and NO to vary.
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 To show that the game G is supermodular we derive the first order
conditions that determine the number of facets (fˆk) and (oˆk) technological opportunities that
each firm decides to pursue in equilibrium.
∂πk
∂ok
= V sk − L(sk)− Co − fkpkCa −
∂Cc
∂ok
= 0 , (23)
∂πk
∂fk
= ok
(
V
pk
F˜
−
∂L
∂sk
pk
F˜
− pkCa +
sk
F˜
[∂V
∂F˜
F˜ − V +
∂L
∂sk
] ∂F˜
∂fk
)
=
okpk
F˜
([
V −
∂L
∂sk
− F˜Ca
]
−
(
V −
∂L
∂sk
− V µ
)
ǫF˜ fk
)
= 0 . (24)
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Figure 7: Simulation of pi for NO ∈ 0, 100 and φ ∈ 0, 1.
Next, consider the cross-partial derivatives which must be positive if the gameG is supermod-
ular. First, we derive the cross partial derivative with respect to firms’ own actions:
∂2πk
∂ok∂fk
=
(
V
pk
F˜
−
∂L
∂sk
pk
F˜
− pkCa +
sk
F˜
[∂V
∂F˜
F˜ − V +
∂L
∂sk
] ∂F˜
∂fk
)
= 0 (25)
This expression corresponds to the first order condition (24) for the optimal number of facets.
Now consider effects of rivals’ actions on firms’ own actions:
∂2πk
∂ok∂oj
=
fk
F˜
[pk
F˜
(∂V
∂F˜
F˜ − V +
∂L
∂sk
)∂F˜
∂oj
+
[
V −
∂L
∂sk
− F˜Ca
]∂pk
∂oj
]
, (26)
∂2πk
∂ok∂fj
=
fk
F˜
[pk
F˜
(∂V
∂F˜
F˜ − V +
∂L
∂sk
)∂F˜
∂fj
+
[
V −
∂L
∂sk
− F˜Ca
]∂pk
∂fj
]
, (27)
∂2πk
∂fk∂oj
=
[
∂V
∂F˜
+
∂2V
∂F˜ 2
F˜ ǫF˜ fk − Ca
]
∂F˜
∂oj
+
(
∂V
∂F˜
F˜ − V +
∂L
∂sk
)
∂ǫF˜ fk
∂oj
+
[∂F˜
∂oj
pk
F˜
−
∂pk
∂oj
] ∂2L
∂sk2
fk
F˜
(
1− ǫF˜ fk
)
, (28)
∂2πk
∂fk∂fj
=
[
∂V
∂F˜
+
∂2V
∂F˜ 2
F˜ ǫF˜ fk − Ca
]
∂F˜
∂fj
+
(
∂V
∂F˜
F˜ − V +
∂L
∂sk
)
∂ǫF˜ fk
∂fj
+
[∂F˜
∂fj
pk
F˜
−
∂pk
∂fj
] ∂2L
∂sk2
fk
F˜
(
1− ǫF˜ fk
)
. (29)
The game is supermodular if the equations (26)-(29) are non-negative. The following results
show that the conditions noted in Proposition 1 must hold simultaneously if the game is su-
permodular.
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Proof of Lemma 1 We have already noted that:
∂F˜
∂oj
> 0,
∂F˜
∂fj
> 0,
∂pk
∂oj
< 0,
∂pk
∂fj
< 0 . (30)
Thus equations (26) and (27) are positive if and only if:
V −
∂V
∂F˜
F˜ −
∂L
∂sk
< 0 V −
∂L
∂sk
− F˜Ca < 0 (31)
Under the conditions of Lemma 1 these inequalities require that µ > 1 and that V < 0. This
second condition contradicts assumption (CI). Also, note that under these conditions the first
order condition (24) implies that:
(
1− ǫF˜ fk
)
+ µǫF˜ fk = 0⇔ (1− µ)
−1 = ǫF˜ fk . (32)
We show in the appendix that 1 ≥ ǫF˜ fk ≥ 0 which would imply that µ < 0 contradicting (31)
above. This shows that in the absence of both types of costs the game G is not supermodular.
We can also show that it is not enough if just one of these costs is positive since the right
hand inequality at 31 can only be fulfilled if there are both legal and administrative costs.
By definition it must be the case that V > F˜Ca or expected profits from patenting would be
negative. Also, note that the the first order condition (23) and assumption LC jointly imply
that V > ∂L
∂sk
. Therefore, the right inequality at 31 can only be satisfied if there are both legal
and administrative costs. This proves Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2 Rewriting the first order condition (24) allowing for legal and adminis-
trative costs implies:
V − ∂L
∂sk
− F˜Ca
V − ∂L
∂sk
− V µ
= ǫF˜ fk (33)
Notice that numerator and denominator of the fraction above correspond to the terms on the
left of the inequalities at (31). Both terms must be negative if the inequalities at (31) hold.
This expression shows that one inequality is a multiple of the other: either both or neither
holds. We have also noted that 1 ≥ ǫF˜ fk ≥ 0. Therefore, the fraction above implies that:
F˜Ca < µV (µ, F˜ )⇔ Ca <
∂V
∂F˜
. (34)
We have already noted that firms will not patent unless V > F˜Ca. If the elasticity of the value
of a technological opportunity with respect to covered facets (µ) is less than one, the condition
here provides an upper bound for the costs of maintaining granted patents (Ca).
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Proof of Lemma 3 We have already shown that:
∂F˜
∂oj
> 0,
∂F˜
∂fj
> 0,
∂ǫF˜ fk
∂oj
< 0,
∂ǫF˜ fk
∂fj
< 0 . (35)
The terms in square brackets in equations (28) and (29) are positive if µ > 1. If 1 > µ > 0,
then the term is positive in the limit as ǫF˜ fk approaches zero. This happens as more firms com-
pete for a given technological opportunity and NO increases. The second terms in equations
(28) and (29) are negative if the inequalities at (31) are satisfied. The third terms in equations
(28) and (29) are always negative by Assumption (LC).
Thus equations (28) and (29) can only be positive if the first positive term outweighs the
negative terms. Greater complexity of the technology has two effects: it raises the number
of covered facets reducing fk
/
F and thus making the third term in both equations smaller
and it increases ∂F˜
/
fj strengthening the first positive term in equation (29). An increase in
the number of competing firms reduces the elasticity of covered facets ǫF˜ fk . This also has
two effects: it reduces the derivatives multiplying the second terms in both equations and as
noted it raises the likelihood that the first terms in both equations are positive if µ < 1. These
findings prove Lemma 3.
Proof of Corrolary 1 This result arises because ∂F˜
∂NO
∂NO
∂N
> 0, ∂pi
∂NO
∂NO
∂N
< 0 and
∂ǫ
F˜ f˜i
∂NO
∂NO
∂N
<
0 as we show in Appendices A.1 and A.2. Then, we can show that:
∂2πk
∂ok∂N
=
fk
F˜
[pk
F˜
(∂V
∂F˜
N˜O − V +
∂L
∂sk
) ∂F˜
∂NO
+
[
V −
∂L
∂sk
− F˜Ca
] ∂pk
∂NO
]∂NO
∂N
> 0, (36)
∂2πk
∂fk∂N
=
[
∂V
∂F˜
+
∂2V
∂F˜ 2
F˜ ǫF˜ fk − Ca
]
∂F˜
∂NO
∂NO
∂N
+
(
∂V
∂F˜
F˜ − V +
∂L
∂sk
)
∂ǫF˜ fk
∂NO
∂NO
∂N
+
[ ∂F˜
∂NO
pk
F˜
−
∂pk
∂NO
]∂NO
∂N
∂2L
∂sk2
fk
F˜
(
1− ǫF˜ fk
)
> 0 . (37)
Note that equation (36) has the same structure as equations (26, (27)) while equation (37)
has the same structure as equations (28, (29)). This shows that Corollary 1 holds if Proposition
1 holds.
Proof of Proposition 2 To determine the effects of an increase in technological opportunity
O we investigate the following cross-partial derivatives:
∂2π˜i
∂oi∂O
and
∂2π˜i
∂f˜i∂O
. (38)
If the game set out above is smooth supermodular, it follows from equations (26) and (28)
that both cross-derivatives here are negative. To see this note that oj and O only enter this
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model as a ratio: an increase in O is equivalent to a reduction in oj .
31 Equations (26) and (28)
are both positive if the game G is smooth supermodular. Their signs are determined by the
derivatives ∂F˜
∂oj
> 0 and ∂pi
∂oj
< 0. The derivatives ∂F˜
∂O
< 0 and ∂pi
∂O
> 0 have exactly opposite
signs, reversing the signs of the cross-partial derivatives above.
Proof of Proposition 3 On one hand F enters our model through the ratio φi. Therefore, an
increase in F is the same as a reduction in fj , indicating that greater complexity should reduce
patenting efforts if Proposition 1 holds. The argument is analogous to that made in the case of
Proposition 2. On the other hand F˜ also increases directly in F :
∂2πk
∂ok∂F
=
fk
F˜
(
∂V
∂F˜
F˜ − V +
∂L
∂sk
)[
pi
F˜
∂F˜
∂F
− ǫF˜ fk
∂pk
∂F
]
(39)
∂2πk
∂fk∂F
=
[(
∂V
∂F˜
F˜ − V +
∂L
∂sk
)
(1− 2ǫF˜ fk)
F˜
+
∂2V
∂F˜ 2
F˜ ǫF˜ fk
]
∂F˜
∂F
+
[∂F˜
∂F
pk
F˜
−
∂pk
∂F
] ∂2L
∂sk2
fk
F˜
(
1− ǫF˜ fk
)
(40)
Here the terms in round brackets in Equations (39) and (40) are positive if the game is smooth
supermodular. These positive terms will determine the sign of both conditions if the elasticity
of covered facets (ǫF˜ fk) goes to zero. As noted in the proof of Lemma 3 this arises as more
firms compete within a technological opportunity.
Proof of Proposition 4 To see that this is true consider the first and second order derivatives
of the payoff function with respect to technological opportunities invested in:
∂π
∂ok
= (V − L− Ca)pk −
∂Cc
∂ok
= 0
∂2π˜
∂ok2
= −
∂2Cc
∂ok2
. (41)
If we assume that costs of coordinating technological opportunities are strictly convex:
∂2Cc
∂ok
2 > 0, then Proposition 4 can be proved with the help of the implicit function theorem:
∂ok
∂O
= −
∂2π˜
∂ok∂O
/
∂2π˜
∂ok2
> 0 , (42)
where ∂
2π˜
∂ok∂O
= (V − L− Ca)
∂p
∂O
> 0.
Proof of Corrolary 2 To see this is true note that ∂
2π˜
∂ok∂N
= (V − L − Ca)
∂pk
∂NO
∂NO
∂N
< 0.
Then:
∂ok
∂N
= −
∂2π˜
∂ok∂N
/
∂2π˜
∂ok2
< 0 . (43)
31Compare the discussion of the expected number of rivals investing in the same technological opportunity
(NO) in Appendix A.1.
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C Results from OLS and Fixed Effects Regressions
Table 7: Patent Applications Estimates using OLS and Fixed Effects
OLS models Fixed effects models
Variable OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 FE 1 FE 2 FE 3
log Patentcountt−1 0.586*** 0.562*** 0.560*** 0.170*** 0.155*** 0.154***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log Patentcountt−1× Triples 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Non Patent References (NPR) 0.057*** 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.004 0.012 -0.011
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
NPR × Triples -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000* 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NPR × Triples × Large -0.000*** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
NPR × Large 0.022*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.006)
Fragmentation 0.569*** 0.546*** 0.544*** 0.456*** 0.432*** 0.431***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Fragmentation × Triples 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Triples 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Areas 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Large 0.183*** 0.189*** 0.174*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.226***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Primary area dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.116*** 0.031* 0.041** 0.066***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
R-squared 0.686 0.688 0.688 0.323 0.324 0.324
N 173448 173448 173448 173448 173448 173448
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
43
D LED Technology
Light emitting diodes (LED) are based on physical principles that were discovered in the early
20th century and were first introduced as a practical electronic component by Holonyak and
Bevacqua (1962). LEDs consist of semiconducting material that has been impregnated with
impurities to create so-called p-n-junctions that generate the physical characteristic of diodes,
i.e., current is flowing only from the anode-side to the cathode-side, but not in the reverse
direction. Depending on the materials used to impregnate the chip underlying the diode and
the way of applying it to the supporting material, different wavelengths of light are emitted
by LEDs. Historically, the first usable LEDs were infrared and red devices based on gallium
arsenide.
Since the emergence of the first red LEDs, major research paths in LED-technology can
be classified in two broad categories comprising (i) the identification of different materials to
produce different colours and (ii) improvement of efficiency and operational parameters. The
combination of the results from R&D in these two dimensions led to the gradual improvement
of this technology.
The nature of the research conducted within the realm of LEDs is a good example of how
we think about technology areas in terms of technology opportunity and patentable facets.
First, the different materials that are used to impregnate semiconducting materials can be
thought of as separate technological opportunities in the technology area of LEDs. Discovery
of novel materials that can be used in the production of LEDs stems from basic research that
can be conducted within firms or within universities.
Second, different materials require novel production techniques since efficient impregna-
tion of the semiconducting base of LEDs largely depends on the characteristics of the material
used (Yam and Hassan, 2005). Therefore, the emergence of novel materials opens up a certain
number of patentable facets. Once a novel material has been discovered, firms have to adapt
their production techniques to efficiently manufacture LEDs using that material and they have
to invest in opportunity-specific R&D to do so. We model these specific R&D efforts as Co in
our theoretical model. Note that such opportunity specific R&D can also lead to more efficient
LEDs over time.
Both novel manufacturing techniques as well as efficiency gains can be protected by patent
rights and therefore can be considered as examples of patentable facets. If separate firms en-
gage in R&D activities within opportunities it is likely that more than one firm obtains patents
on crucial production steps. This might give rise to situations where firms need to access
competitors property rights - which we consider to be a hallmark of a complex technology. In
fact, patents are crucial in the LED industry and a high degree of cross-licensing and infringe-
ment law-suits among can be observed. A list of relevant deals and disputes can be found on
http://www.ledsmagazine.com/features/1/8/21/1.
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E Complex and Discrete Technologies
Table 8: Classification of technology areas according to OST-INPI/FhG-ISI
Area Code Description Classification
1 Electrical machinery, electrical energy Complex
2 Audiovisual technology Complex
3 Telecommunications Complex
4 Information technology Complex
5 Semiconductors Complex
6 Optics Complex
7 Analysis, measurement, control technology Complex
8 Medical technology Complex
9 Nuclear engineering Complex
10 Organic fine chemistry Discrete
11 Macromolecular chemistry, polymers Discrete
12 Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics Discrete
13 Biotechnology Discrete
14 Agriculture, food chemistry Discrete
15 Chemical and petrol industry, basic mat Discrete
16 Chemical engineering Discrete
17 Surface technology, coating Discrete
18 Materials, metallurgy Discrete
19 Materials processing, textiles paper Discrete
20 Handling, printing Discrete
21 Agricultural and food processing, machin Discrete
22 Environmental technology Complex
23 Machine tools Complex
24 Engines, pumps and turbines Complex
25 Thermal processes and apparatus Complex
26 Mechanical elements Complex
27 Transport Complex
28 Space technology, weapons Complex
29 Consumer goods and equipments Complex
30 Civil engineering, building, mining Complex
Description of the 30 technology areas contained in the OST-INPI/FhG-ISI technology nomenclature.
We classified the 30 technology areas as complex or discrete attempting to replicate the classification
of Cohen et al. (2000).
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